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Abstract  
As smartphones become increasingly integral to our daily lives, so too is the prevalence of malware for 
smartphones. This is because while mobile phones used to only function as portable phones, today's 
mobile phones are now miniature computers. This means that risks that used to only be for computers are 
now risks for our smartphones as well. As a result, a research stream dedicated to understanding what’s 
unique about smartphone malware has emerged. In this study, we analyze malware characteristics from a 
non-technical view, unlike previous studies. Previous studies analyze the actual code and execution of 
malware, while we take advantage of anti-virus companies analysis of malware already conducted, and 
instead analyze these analyses. We do this to discover trends that are emerging in smartphone malware, 
such that anti-virus companies can give these trends greater priority to researching and discovering these 
malware. 
Keywords  
mobile malware, android malware, malware trends.  
Introduction 
One of the never ending problems that both users and organizations have is malware. Malware is a term 
used to describe malicious software on computers that can steal data, delete files, or otherwise harm an 
individual. Malware has been around since at least 1988, where the first Internet Worm was created (i.e. 
the Morris Worm). Since then, it has been only a growing problem for two primary reasons: the first being 
that malware continues to become more harmful (such as locking a user out of their computer unless they 
pay a ransom), and that it is getting harder to catch all malware due to the reliance of using signatures to 
detect malware. As a result, malware continues to become more prevalent. In this paper, we concentrate 
on one example of this – malware now being on smartphones.  Malware on smartphones is increasing at 
an alarming rate. Between December 2012 and December 2013, there was an increase of malware on 
smartphones of 197% (McAfee 2014). In this study, we only concentrate on Android smartphones, as they 
are the most targeted smartphones for malware and they have the most market-share at 75% (Faruki et al. 
2015; Kelly 2014).  
Previous literature for smartphone malware has focused on various aspects. From a technical standpoint, 
one of the most popular topics is to study the characteristics of smartphone malware in order to improve 
anti-virus software for smartphones (Arabo and Pranggono 2013; Ho and Heng 2009; Zhou and Jiang 
2012). Similarly, there are studies that concentrate on improving detection of malware on third-party app 
stores, surveying the status of malware on different markets, identifying trends of anti-virus companies, 
or simply listing the challenges that currently exist in the smartphone malware literature (Arabo and 
Pranggono 2013; Shaerpour and Dehghantanha 2013; Zhou et al. 2012). Finally, research has focused on 
analyzing Android malware from an aspect on how to best analyze the malware – dynamically or 
statically, and proposing new solutions to help malware investigators better discover and analyze malware 
(Allix et al. 2014; Karlsson and Glisson 2014; Linger et al. 2011; Smith and Pridgen 2012). From a 
behavioral standpoint, literature has concentrated on the need for better training, studying whether users 
have become desensitized to their mobile application requests, and security concerns for small and 
medium enterprises (Brookshire et al. 2015; Harris et al. 2012, 2013).  
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In this study, we take a different approach. While we are studying characteristics of mobile malware, we 
are studying different characteristics than previously studied. Previous characteristics that have been 
studied are very technical and relate to the code of the malware itself (Arabo and Pranggono 2013; Ho and 
Heng 2009; Zhou and Jiang 2012). In this study, we study characteristics relating to the infection 
channels (i.e. the way in which malware is delivered to a smartphone), and mobile malware 
characteristics that the anti-virus companies assign each malware. The primary research question in this 
paper is to discover what factors influence mobile malware to be more successful on different infection 
channels, so companies can defend against mobile malware from a behavioral aspect rather than a 
technical aspect. We believe that the characteristics in this paper are critical to understand. This is 
because technical features, which are what previous research has primarily concentrated on, often require 
a technical background in order to fully understand. Additionally, once a characteristic is understood 
about a malware, it is limited in scope – this characteristic will most likely only be found in that malware 
and any of it’s variants (i.e. how it infects a phone, how it steals data, etcetera). These types of 
characteristics are well suited for improving anti-virus software, but they do not help studying malware 
from a behavioral point of view. The characteristics we study in this paper are easier to obtain than actual 
malware, as it requires collecting data from anti-virus vendors. Additionally, experts in malware (i.e. the 
anti-virus vendors) have made the classifications used in this dataset, which allows us to utilize their 
knowledge in an inexpensive manner. One of the biggest advantages our characteristics have is that we 
can obtain insights from a higher level, such as the trend of malware in a given time period, in a time 
efficient manner since we do not have to examine the malware manually. Using this insight, organizations 
and individuals can make more informed decisions on how to defend against malware. For example, if we 
find that app stores are more susceptible to malware that is spyware, then app stores can try to inspect 
their apps more carefully for spyware until the trend is over. Additionally, organizations could provide 
targeted training of specific malware that is the most popular to protect against these trends.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the related work of our study. The following 
section introduces our methodology for data collection and analysis. Then, we highlight the findings of the 
study and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude the paper and provide highlight potential future work. 
Related Work 
Malware can be defined as applications that gain access to a device for the purpose of stealing data, 
damaging the device, annoying the user, etcetera (Felt et al. 2011; Ho and Heng 2009). In order for 
malware to get on the smartphone, the malware must convince the user to download it. This can be done 
in various ways, such as by being downloaded when a user accidentally clicks a malicious link, or when the 
user downloads an application that seems safe when it is not. Then, once the application is on the 
smartphone, it uses an exploit or excessive privileges on the smartphone to gain access and achieve its 
goals, such as stealing data (Felt et al. 2011; Ho and Heng 2009). Malware is a broad term, and includes 
specific types such as Trojans, worms, botnets, and viruses (Felt et al. 2011).  
In 2011, there was an increase in mobile malware of 155 percent increase from 2010 (Arabo and 
Pranggono 2013). Malware targeting Android smartphones experienced the largest increase, as in 2011 
there was a 3325 percent increase (Arabo and Pranggono 2013; Zhou and Jiang 2012). The reason that 
Android smartphones are targeted so much is that Android, the operating system of the smartphone, is 
open source. What this means is that anyone can look at the technical details of the operating system and 
discover exploits much easier than normal. Additionally, Android smartphones are the best selling 
smartphones in the market. This leads to Android smartphones being the most targeted smartphones for 
malware. Google tried to prevent this by making applications declare permissions that they required on 
the smartphone, and the user could approve the access (Shaerpour and Dehghantanha 2013). 
However, it has been shown that users don’t understand the warnings and as a result, disregard the 
warnings (Bal 2014; Shaerpour and Dehghantanha 2013). As a result, researchers have done tests to see 
much malware exists on the official Android marketplace, and how much exists in alternative markets 
(Zhou et al. 2012). Alternative markets are places where users can buy and download applications that 
aren’t supported by Google, such as Amazon’s app store. These alternative markets are generally not as 
strictly regulated as the application store from the manufacturer, and research supports this. It was found 
in 2012 that the Android market had a 0.02% infection rate, while alternative markets had 0.20-0.47% 
infection rate (Zhou et al. 2012). While this rate is very low and may make users think that they shouldn’t 
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worry about mobile malware, this is incorrect. When a new malware called DroidDream was released, it 
took 48 hours for Google to remove the malware from the Android market and infected more than 
260,000 users (Zhou et al. 2012). This is enough time for malware to cause serious harm to these users, 
whether it may be damaging their phone or stealing sensitive data.  
As emphasized throughout this literature review, most of the previous literature has been setting the stage 
for future research. This has included defining mobile malware, which is an important step in a new 
domain. They then moved onto studying characteristics of mobile malware to improve detection, trends in 
malware detection to find short comings, and improvements on detecting mobile malware. In this study, 
we are studying characteristics of malware to help understand how to better detect and prevent malware 
in the future.  
Methodology 
To collect data, we manually gathered data using Trend Micro’s database of threats (TrendMicro 2016). 
While data collection began November 24, 2015, we went back as far as January 1, 2012 to collect data. 
This continued until December 15, 2016. This resulted in 155 unique malware’s characteristics being 
obtained. We obtained the following information for each malware: name, date the malware’s information 
as published, threat sub-type, threat type, damage potential, distribution potential, and infection channel.  
Threat sub-type represents what Trend Micro classified the actual malware to do. Threat sub-type consists 
of seven unique categories. These categories were: Click Fraud, Hacking Tool, Information Stealer, 
Malicious Downloader, Premium Service Abuser, Rooting Tool, and Spying Tool. The threat type was the 
type of malware that was classified, where there were six different types: adware, backdoor, cracking 
application, hacking tool, spyware, and Trojan. Damage potential is how much potential the malware has 
to damage a smartphone or it’s user, which from low to critical. Damage potential was simply classified as 
low, medium, high, or critical. In this dataset no high damage potential malware was found, so the only 
categories ended up being low, medium, or critical. Distribution potential is how much potential a 
malware has to spread rapidly, and it was simply classified as low, medium, high, or critical. In this 
dataset no high distribution was found. Infection channel is how the malware gets put onto the phone, 
and there were six categories, which were app store (which includes both Google Play and other third 
party app stores), downloaded from the Internet, dropped by other malware, manually installed, SMS 
messages, and visiting malicious websites.  
The collected data was analyzing using the IBM SPSS Statistics 22 software (IBM 2015). The statistical 
significance and strength of interactions between the different malware characteristics were analyzed 
through contingency tables, the Pearson’s χ2 tests of independence, and the Cramer’s V coefficients. We 
considered only results that had a p-value that was below 0.05. We chose to use contingency tables as our 
method of analysis as we are doing an exploratory study, we wanted a statistical analysis method that was 
flexible and allowed us to find unique interactions. More traditional methods were not chosen, such as 
ANOVAs, as most of our data was categorical, which greatly limits what methods of analysis we can use.  
While using contingency tables are uncommon, we are not the only ones who have done so. Contingency 
table has been used for varying purposes, including but not limited to: discovering what favors influenced 
people to adopt exercise games, test what characteristics contribute to the differentiation of crowdfunding 
intermediaries, uncover conjunctions between mobile enterprise application characteristics, to discover 
the extent of reviews differing among open source projects, and to analyze the interaction between user 
skill level, travel product, and online shopping motivation (Asundi and Jayant 2007; Beldona et al. 2005; 
Giessmann et al. 2012; Haas et al. 2014; Kari 2015).  
Results 
As shown in Table 1, we analyze the interaction of dates and threat subtype. When looking through this 
contingency table, some interesting trends emerge. While some threat subtypes such as click fraud, and 
hacking tools have stayed around the same throughout the years, the other threat subtypes have more 
interesting results. For example, when analyzing information stealer, we can see that this type of threat 
subtype was extremely common in 2012, but as the years progressed it dwindled down to a negligible 
amount of malware. This trend continues for the premium service abuser and spying tool as well. This is a 
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strange trend, as this would argue that the overall amount of malware is decreasing over time, as well as 
threat subtypes. This seems counterintuitive, as many people argue that malware is continuing to grow at 
an exponential pace (PRNewswire 2012).  
Threat Subtype 
Date Click 
Fraud 
Hacking 
Tool 
Information 
Stealer 
Malicious 
Downloader 
Premium 
Service 
Abuser 
Rooting 
Tool 
Spying 
Tool 
2012 1 2 35 4 20 8 8 
2013 3 1 18 0 4 2 0 
2014 5 3 9 1 3 3 0 
2015 3 0 6 1 1 6 2 
Table 1. Threat Subtype by Date 
Analyzing Table 2, more counterintuitive findings emerge. While the trend of malware decreasing over the 
years has emerged, as discovered previously, a more interesting trend emerges in this contingency table. 
Over the years, the amount of low damaging malware has gone to zero, the amount of medium damaging 
malware has stayed about the same, and the amount of critically damaging malware has decreased 
dramatically over the years. If news reports and academia are to be believed, this should not be the case – 
the amount of malware and the damage potential should be at least maintaining, if not increasing.  
Damage Potential 
Date Low Medium Critical 
2012 14 15 49 
2013 2 4 22 
2014 3 16 5 
2015 0 12 7 
Table 2. Damage Potential by Date  
From Table 3, we can see that the trends that emerge from this contingency table are not as interesting as 
previous discovered. The overall trend is that the distribution potential of all malware is decreasing to a 
low distribution potential, and the amount of malware has decreased over the years. Is this trend due to 
better warnings and awareness to the end user, or are smartphone manufacturers better securing 
exploits? No one agrees that either of these are the cases, in fact they argue the opposite (Faruki et al. 
2015; Linger et al. 2011; Zhou et al. 2012, 2012). Therefore, this is another interesting trend that has 
emerged.  
Distribution Potential 
Date Low Medium Critical 
2012 71 7 0 
2013 25 3 0 
2014 15 7 1 
2015 16 2 0 
Table 3. Distribution Potential by Date  
Table 4 shows the contingency table for infection channel by date. While some infection channels, such as 
SMS messages and the app store have maintained a similar trend throughout the years, the rest of the 
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infection channels have shown a drastic decrease. For example, visiting malicious websites has dropped to 
zero in 2015, while it was the second largest infection channel in 2012. While not as drastic, this is also the 
case for downloaded from the internet and manually installed. We again wonder why this counterintuitive 
result has emerged – both academia and practitioners agree that mobile malware is a continuing issue, 
not one that is solving itself. This concludes the discussion of any of the malware characteristics and 
dates.  
   Infection 
Channel 
   
Date App Store Downloaded 
From Internet 
Dropped by 
Other 
Malware 
Manually 
Installed 
SMS 
Messages 
Visiting 
Malicious 
Websites 
2012 9 12 8 28 1 20 
2013 7 0 2 7 2 10 
2014 10 2 2 8 1 1 
2015 6 3 0 9 1 0 
Table 4. Infection Channel by Date 
Starting in this section, we start analyzing the different malware characteristics when compared to the 
threat subtype of the malware. Table 5 shows the contingency table for damage potential by threat 
subtype. We see that spying tools are never a low damage risk – they are only medium or critical. This 
makes sense as spying tools are always gathering private information about a user that they would not 
want leaked – such as their login credentials, their contacts list, and their private messages.  All of the 
results in Table 5 are intuitive and help confirm that the current understanding of threat subtypes is 
correct.    
Damage Potential 
Threat 
Subtype 
Low Medium Critical 
Click Fraud 2 9 1 
Hacking 
Tool 
1 2 3 
Information 
Stealer 
3 14 51 
Malicious 
Downloader 
1 4 1 
Premium 
Service 
Abuser 
7 13 8 
Rooting 
Tool 
5 1 13 
Spying Tool 0 4 6 
Table 5. Damage Potential by Threat Subtype 
Table 6 shows the contingency table for threat type by threat subtype. One of the most obvious results is 
that Trojans are the most common type of smartphone malware, which supports existing literature 
(Faruki et al. 2015; Shaerpour and Dehghantanha 2013). We can additionally confirm that our definitions 
for threat type makes sense by using the threat subtypes. For example, spyware only has the the subtypes 
of information stealers and spying tool, which makes intuitive sense. Spyware, as discussed earlier, is 
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spying on the user and stealing their information – which is what spying tools and information stealers do 
respectively. Click Fraud only makes up Adware and Trojans, which again make sense. Adware shows 
annoying ads that may charge users, while Trojan may pretend to be an app that it is not – such a game 
with in-app purchases. Hacking tools are only hacking tools and Trojans, the surprising one out of these 
two is the fact that Trojans can be hacking tools. However, this is most likely due to the fact a user may 
want a hacking tool, but the official app store may not want this listed – therefore the app will pretend to 
be something else. Information stealer can be adware, backdoor, spyware, and Trojans which makes 
intuitive sense. Malicious downloaders can only be found in Trojans – which could be surprising that 
backdoors are not included in this. However, the fact Trojans can be malicious downloaders make sense – 
if a Trojan is doing something malicious, it may need to download additional tasks without the user 
knowing, which can constitute as a malicious downloader. Premium service abusers were found to only be 
backdoors and Trojans. Rooting tools were found to be in backdoors, hacking tools, and Trojans. Again, 
this is not surprising.  
Threat Type 
Threat 
Subtype 
Adware Backdoor Hacking 
Tool 
Spyware Trojan 
Click Fraud 1 0 0 0 11 
Hacking 
Tool 
0 0 4 0 2 
Information 
Stealer 
4 19 0 6 39 
Malicious 
Downloader 
0 0 0 0 6 
Premium 
Service 
Abuser 
0 2 0 0 26 
Rooting 
Tool 
0 2 15 0 2 
Spying Tool 0 1 0 6 3 
Table 6. Threat Type by Threat Subtype 
From Table 7, we can see that manual installation, app store, and visiting malicious websites are the most 
common way to obtain smartphone malware. This is not surprising, and is intuitive. What is more 
interesting is how information stealer, malicious downloader, and premium service abusers are the type 
of malware that gets dropped by other malware. Additionally, click fraud, information stealer, and 
premium service abusers are the type of malware that gets installed via SMS messages. The rest of the 
results are intuitive and are not discussed further.  
Infection Channel 
Threat 
Subtype 
App Store Download 
From 
Internet 
Dropped by 
Other 
Malware 
Manually 
Installed 
SMS 
Messages 
Visiting 
Malicious 
Websites 
Click Fraud 6 1 0 3 1 1 
Hacking 
Tool 
2 1 0 3 0 0 
Information 
Stealer 
11 7 8 19 3 20 
Malicious 2 1 1 2 0 0 
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Downloader 
Premium 
Service 
Abuser 
6 4 3 6 1 8 
Rooting 
Tool 
2 0 0 16 0 1 
Spying Tool 3 3 0 3 0 1 
Table 7. Infection Channel by Threat Subtype 
Table 8 allows us to see which types of threat types are the most damaging. Unsurprisingly, Trojans, 
backdoors, and hacking tools are the most critically damaging smartphone malware. What is a bit 
surprising being that adware has been critical damaging according to TrendMicro, which contradicts the 
normal understanding of adware – which is typically just annoying and may obtain minor information 
about a user.  
Threat Type 
Damage 
Potential 
Adware Backdoor Hacking 
Tool 
Spyware Trojan 
Low 0 1 5 0 13 
Medium 1 3 2 2 39 
Critical 5 24 19 12 89 
Table 8. Threat Type by Damage Potential 
Table 9 shows us to how malware is obtained. Not surprisingly, Trojans can be obtained in all infection 
channels, and it is the only type of malware that can do so. It is also not surprising that hacking tools and 
backdoors are most commonly manually installed.  Most of these results are intuitive and make sense.  
Infection Channel 
Threat Type App Store Downloaded 
From 
Internet 
Dropped by 
Other 
Malware 
Manually 
Installed 
SMS 
Messages 
Visiting 
Malicious 
Websites 
Adware 2 1 0 0 0 2 
Backdoor 3 0 1 12 1 7 
Hacking 
Tool 
1 0 0 17 0 1 
Spyware 3 2 0 3 0 4 
Trojan 23 14 11 20 4 17 
Table 9. Infection Channel by Threat Type 
Table 10 shows the statistical significance of all the contingency tables discussed so far. All of the 
contingency tables meet our p-value requirement of being less than 0.05, as otherwise they were not 
included in our discussion. We are primarily interested in Cramer’s V, as Cramer’s V is used to measure 
the strength of the association between variables, and allows variables to have more than 2 categories. We 
interpret Cramer’s V as follows: anything below 0.15 is unacceptable, 0.15 to 0.20 is weak, 0.20 to 0.25 is 
moderate, 0.25 to 0.30 is moderately strong, 0.30 to 0.35 is strong, 0.35 to 0.40 is very strong, 0.40 to 
0.50 indicates either an extremely good relationship or two variables measuring the same concept. 
Anything above 0.50 indicates that both variables are probably measuring the same concept.  Analyzing 
Table 10, distribution potential by date is the only one that has a moderate relationship. We have no 
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relationships that are weak. Threat subtype by date, infection channel by date, infection channel by threat 
subtype, threat type by damage potential, and infection channel by threat type all have a moderately 
strong relationship.  Damage potential by date and damage potential by threat subtype have a strong 
relationship. Finally, threat type by threat subtype is our only worrisome result with a Cramer’s V of 
0.533, which means that they may be measuring the same concept. This is unsurprising, as threat subtype 
can easily be seen as a subset of threat type. Therefore, we do not consider this relationship any further.  
 
Contingency Table Results 
 Pearson χ2 Cramer’s V p-value 
Threat Subtype 
by Date 
37.512 .290 .004 
Damage 
Potential by 
Date 
36.356 .349 .000 
Distribution 
Potential by 
Date 
18.161 .202 .033 
Infection 
Channel by 
Date 
31.168 .264 .008 
Damage 
Potential by 
Threat Subtype 
45.127 .389 .000 
Threat Type by 
Threat Subtype 
169.089 0.533 .000 
Infection 
Channel by 
Threat Subtype 
47.556 .253 .022 
Threat Type by 
Damage 
Potential 
26.105 .296 .001 
Infection 
Channel by 
Threat Type 
47.589 .283 .000 
Table 10. Contingency Table Results 
As we found earlier, the following relationships are significant: distribution potential by date, threat 
subtype by date, infection channel by date, infection channel by threat sub type, threat type by damage 
potential, infection channel by threat type, damage potential by date and damage potential by threat 
subtype. It is important to understand these characteristics since they are significant. Out of these 
relationships, date is the most reoccurring characteristic. This is unsurprising as we are investigating 
trends, and the trends change over time which make them significant. However, what is more interesting 
is how often threat type and threat sub type are significant. Therefore, we argue that these two 
characteristics are the most critical of this study, as their definitions are not necessarily intuitive or easily 
agreed upon. For example, threat type in this study is defined as adware, backdoors, hacking tools, 
spyware, or Trojans. If any of these specific characteristics, such as Trojans, are chosen to be further 
studied, we could help detect and preempt malware. For example, we can see trend wise that Trojans have 
continued to become more popular throughout the years. This is unsurprising as malware can pretend to 
be games to guarantee a large amount of downloads. Therefore, a further analysis conducted only on 
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Trojans could help detect and prevent Trojans. From our analysis alone, we know that Trojans are most 
commonly downloaded form the App store or manually installed, that they are in varying damage 
potential (although they are primarily very damaging), and that they are primarily information stealers. 
This means that future research should concentrate on how to mitigate this information stealing so that 
sensitive data is not stolen from the user, and this should be kept in mind when further developing the 
Android operating system.  
Conclusion 
This research heavily relies on TrendMicro’s dataset, which greatly limits our generalizability to all 
smartphone malware. If this dataset could be combined with other anti-virus vendors, such as Symantec 
and Virus Total, then we may get a larger dataset that as a result could be a better representation of 
smartphone malware as a whole. Additionally, we may be able to obtain other characteristics that may not 
be categorical, which could open additional statistical method analysis. We also rely on the fact that the 
anti-virus software has to detect the malware, then analyze it and report it online (Allix et al. 2014). This 
is an obvious limitation, as there are many malware that aren’t found yet. Additionally, it takes quite a 
while for anti-virus companies to release data on the malware they find, especially detailed analysis like 
we require for this study. Additionally, we do not have sound theory on why the interactions discovered in 
this study were found significant as this was an exploratory research. Discovering why these interactions 
were found significant, and if they hold up to different datasets, is left to future research. Finally, we did 
not fully investigate the what, how, and why of the malware characteristics studied in this paper which 
should be further investigated.  
This study examined the different relationships between various smartphone malware characteristics, 
including threat type, infection channel, damage potential, and distribution potential. We discovered that 
threat subtype by date, damage potential by date, distribution potential by date, infection channel by date, 
damage potential by threat subtype, infection channel by threat subtype, threat type by damage potential, 
and infection channel by threat type were all significant interactions. This means that for both end-users 
and anti-virus companies, these are the interactions that should be examined to discover smartphone 
malware trends in order to improve better detection and avoiding download these malware in the first 
place. We have studied malware characteristics that do not require technical expertise, or to download the 
malware ourselves. This should inspire future studies to take a similar approach, that way research can be 
conducted more safely and quicker.  
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